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The rise of P2P technology produced a prediction that ubiquitous access to an 
unlimited choice of music, known as the Celestial Jukebox, would loosen the 
market control and hence bring about cultural diversity in the market. As the 
streaming music business grows, however, this celebrated musical experience is 
giving rise to a resurgence of market control. Underlying the difference between 
the prediction and the reality is the unexpected problem that has arisen in the 
process of technological development. This article unravels this missing link by 
demonstrating the underlying dynamics involved in the innovation process 
through which digital technologies are applied, consumed, and used in the music 
business.   
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Introduction 
The arrival of Napster, the pioneering digital music service based on Peer-To-Peer 
(“P2P”) technology, opened up new ways of enjoying music. One of the major changes 
this new medium has brought is ubiquity of music listening with an immeasurable scope 
of music choices, known as the “Celestial Jukebox”. While Napster and its progeny 
have offered this vision since 1999, it was only recently that it became a highly visible 
reality, when streaming services, sparked by Spotify, arose as a new digital music 
consuming platform, bringing the majority of digital music users back into the legal 
arena. Its legal and unlimited access to music prompted some commentators to claim 
that Spotify is “exactly what music fans had been waiting for, fulfilling the long-sought 
dream of a ‘celestial jukebox’ — a service that makes every song always available, 
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freely and legally” (Pollack 2011).  
The Celestial Jukebox is depicted as an ideal form of musical experience where 
consumers can access an “immeasurable scope of the (music) heavens” (Harvey 2014), 
and artists are compensated for each transaction of music consumption. Professor Paul 
Goldstein (2003) praised this idea as a Holy Grail that could perfect the primary idea of 
Intellectual Property Law. The underlining presumption is that removing the barriers to 
music access, combined with peer review and viral impact on the Internet, could help 
fans to discover lesser-known or unknown music, therefore contributing to the 
achievement of the beloved cultural attribute where a diversity of music choices would 
flourish (Mann 2000; Pasquale III, Weatherall, and Fagin 2002) As more than 100 
million digital music users have come on board with streaming music services, 
however, it is becoming clear that the majority of music consumers need and want their 
choices to be dictated to them by established tastemakers and media. This dilemma has 
brought back the industry’s long-established practice: filtering. At the dawn of this new 
change, a plethora of intermediaries are trying to influence consumers’ choices. 
Drawing upon this change, this paper investigates the underlying dynamics involved in 
digital music discovery and demonstrates how the untrammeled garden of music 
choices is, paradoxically, bringing about a resurgence of market control.  
A Brief History of Music Discovery 
Listening to music was, for a long time, “a temporal, fleeting experience – and a rare 
treat…most often heard in church and perhaps at home, if someone had talent, not to 
mention a piano” (Coleman 2004, 1). This changed with the invention of the 
phonograph in 1877: sounds were recorded and fixed on a product to be multiplied and 
distributed to the public. Soon, the making of the record industry began when the 
Columbia Phonograph Corporation recognised the commercial value of phonography by 
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developing a “nickel-in-the-slot” machine (Frith 1987) This first pay-per-play-based 
music streaming technology, introduced in 1899, allowed people to listen to a recording 
of their choice on the machine for a nickel.  
A series of technological developments in recording, reproducing and listening 
to music facilitated the structuring of the music industry to distribute and sell music 
embedded in physical artefacts. This system required extensive skills and costs to 
produce and distribute physical products of music. It therefore produced a brick-and-
mortar infrastructure in which large-scale production, physical logistics, and shelf-space 
made the system highly capital-intensive. In the process of music distribution, which 
involved manufacturing, the mass production of physical products, storing products in 
warehouses, and finally delivering products to retailers, “each of these technologies was 
initially expensive, specialized, and not accessible to individuals” (Kernfeld 2011, 14).  
Besides the substantial financial investment required to produce music, 
consumers’ fickle and unpredictable musical tastes rendered the music business 
particularly uncertain and risky (Hirsch 1969, 64). To the extent that the process of 
creative production entails uncertainty and high risk, it became crucial to exercise 
control over consumers’ access to music choices in order to ensure a sufficient return on 
investment. Hence, the music industry developed strategies to ensure the maximisation 
of profits and the minimisation of risk (Burnett 1992, 755). These strategies included 
negotiating different terms with artists depending on their previous success – long-term 
contracts for successful artists, and short-term ones for the rest – so that the industry 
could hedge its bets through a wide range of products and oversupply in order to make 
sure that at least some artists were commercially successful enough to cover the cost of 
all of the unsuccessful records (Burnett 1992, 755).  
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The industry also developed a structure to control the creative process through 
which the exposure of the selected products could be maximised (Burnett 1996, 73). To 
that end, it created an artificial scarcity as a rival good by developing a pre-filtering 
system. In this way, the music industry overcame the problem of the limited space 
needed to store the goods, as well as controlling distribution and consumer prices. In 
this system of pre-selected music discovery, radio played an essential role. The 
following section discusses these two important aspects of music discovery in more 
detail: (1) Pre-selection; and (2) Radio. 
(1) Pre-selection 
In an effort to maximise the exposure of their products and in turn increase the 
possibility of recouping their investment, the music industry structured a network of 
complex organisations in which discovery and filtering was processed at each level of 
the network (Hirsch 1972). The filtering process meant that the final cultural item that 
consumers could access was an outcome of the pre-selection process, which often 
involved negotiations over conflicting interests and unbalanced power relations (Turow 
1992). In other words, consumers’ choices became highly contingent on market 
availability. The consequence of this was that musical taste was flattened by the market 
structure. As DiMaggio (1977, 92) succintly stated,  
 
“Taste is first levelled, then homogenized. Significant innovation becomes rare and 
the thematic range of popular culture narrows as the search for a mass audience 
forces corporate producers to transcend “the peculiar interests and preoccupations 
of the special and segmented organized groups and direct their appeal to the mass.”  
A prominent contribution to understanding this pre-selection process was made 
by Hirsch (1969), who investigated the industrial mechanism behind the filtering 
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process. Drawing upon the way in which certain songs became popular, he drew up the 
framework, “The Organization of the Pop Music Industry”. In this hierarchical filtering 
process, he identified four important agents that played a crucial role in a song’s 
popularity: the A&R agent, the record company, the promoter/distributor, and the radio 
station/media outlet. This process highlighted that “each object must be ‘discovered’, 
sponsored, and brought to public attention by entrepreneurial organisations or non-profit 
agencies before the originating artist or writer can be linked successfully to the intended 
audience” (Hirsch 1972, 640). Wikström (2013, 53) later summarised the extensive 
process of filtering involved in each stage of the pre-selection system:  
“Only a small fraction of all artists are ever able even to meet an A&R agent, and 
only very few out of all the acts that an A&R agent ever listens to attract the 
attention of the record executive. Eventually, only one artist ‘in a million’ will be 




Figure 1. The Organization of the Pop Music Industry (Hirsch 1969)  
 
(2) Radio 
Of the four agents involved in Hirsch’s (1969) model, radio played a particularly vital 
role in influencing consumers’ music discovery and choice. Before radio became a 
popular medium for music listening in the 1950s, the main way to discover music was 
to go to a music venue, be that a street or a proper concert hall. As radio became a basic 
home appliance used in almost every household, it brought “a feeling of connectedness” 
through everyone listening to the same tune on the radio (Taylor, Katz, and Grajeda 
2012, 4). Radio, therefore, became an important outlet for songs’ discovery. The 
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interdependent relationship between record companies and commercial radio stations 
built over time was so great that Hirsch called the recording industry, “The Top 40 
Music Industry” (Hirsch 1969, 9). Emphasising the crucial role that radio played in the 
success of the record business, he described radio airplay as the “lifeline” of a record 
company (Hirsch 1969, 32). Frith (2002, 201) also called it “the most significant 
twentieth-century mass medium” and stressed that “radio is still the most important 
source of popular musical discourse, defining genres and genre communities, shaping 
music history and nostalgia, determining what we mean by ‘popular’ music in the first 
place.” 
In the beginning, however, radio was not conceived of as a popular medium for 
music listening. Fearing that free play would displace album sales, many artists and 
producers resisted the idea of their music being played on the radio. At the height of his 
career, Bing Crosby put the label “Not licensed for radio airplay” on his records 
(Peterson 1990, 105). Likewise, radio stations preferred to play lucrative forms of 
programming such as live music and showed a great disdain for playing records, calling 
them “canned music” (Peterson 1990, 105). However, these stations began to 
experience financial constraints, as, with the advent of television in the 1940s, 
advertising income drifted away from them. They turned to recordings as an 
inexpensive programming strategy. Soon, the record companies realised that radio 
airplay directly correlated with an increase in the sales of a record: only the records that 
received airplay were stocked by the record stores, and the frequency of radio airplay 
determined the sales of the records (Hirsch 1969, 66). What followed was an attempt to 
find a way to keep listeners tuned in in order to increase record sales. Radio stations 
realised that people tended to stay tuned in to listen to familiar music, rather than new 
songs (Frith 2002, 202). From this came the Top 40 playlist; this “ever-narrowing chart 
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based play-list” kept listeners loyal to stations (Frith 1987, 131). A symbiotic 
relationship between radio stations and the record industry was forged. As radio became 
an increasingly important gatekeeper that dictated which songs would grab consumers’ 
attention, record companies became keen to get their artists on the airwaves in order to 
sell more units (Burnett 1996). It was not long before radio became the dominant music 
consumption medium, and the royalties resulting from this phenomenon became a 
significant source of profit for the industry (Frith 1987). 
As the significance of the airwaves increased, so did the importance of disc 
jockeys, who had the power to choose what to play. To ensure that their songs got 
airplay, record companies bribed disk jockeys to play their recordings. This practice, 
known as “payola”, has since been forbidden, but the significance of radio play remains 
due to the essential ripple effect throughout media, which can ultimately lead to success 
in terms of record sales. If a radio station’s playlist is strongly linked to sales, an 
important question that should be asked is how radio stations choose their playlists. The 
way in which stations choose their playlists is determined by multiple factors; not all 
radio stations are commercial broadcasting stations, so it is fair to say that not all 
stations are driven by commercial interests. As far as commercial radio stations are 
concerned, however, the principal aim is to generate revenue from advertisements. 
Radio stations, therefore, are inclined to broadcast popular music that caters to 
segmented group of audiences by providing formatted playlists  (Fornatale and Mills 
1980, 80). The consequence is that in order to ensure that people stay tuned in, radio 
stations choose to play familiar music rather than experimental tunes (Frith 2002). 
Coupled with the labels’ commercial interest in increased sales, this tendency has led to 
a practice that of “settl[ing] for what is easy and familiar” (Crisell 2002, 132) and a 
popular music culture determined by the lowest common denominator (Burnett 1993). 
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Market Control in the Conventional Music Business 
The uncertainty of not knowing what song will be commercially successful forced the 
music industry to obtain a tighter grip by controlling the market (Negus 1992, 152). 
The music industry, therefore, built a structure in which economic power could be 
maintained by preventing competitors from entering the market (Hirsch 1972; 
DiMaggio 1977). This was achieved through market concentration. By 2000, after a 
series of acquisitions and mergers in which smaller labels were absorbed by powerful 
entertainment conglomerates, a tight oligopoly had been firmly established (Hull 2004, 
124). The four major labels at that time, Universal, Sony BMG, Warner, and EMI, 
controlled the distribution of over 80% of the world’s music (Burnett 1996). With the 
extent to which the market was concentrated, control was determined by the firms who 
had a larger market share and ultimately influenced the production of music (Frith 1981, 
90).  
At the centre of the consolidation of the recording industry lay copyright, 
through which multinational firms’ rights-based business was structured (Bakker 2012). 
That means the more repertoire a label owns, the more products the label could use to 
capitalise on. Henceforth, expanding market share became a key strategy for record 
companies (Bakker 2012, 310). As a result, many independent labels built links with 
major labels (Negus 1992; Burnett 1996).  
Distribution was another essential part of market control, as it eliminated – or at 
least reduced – the uncertainty entailed in investment (Hirsch 2006). This control has 
long been in the hands of the major labels in the form of an oligopoly (Negus 1992). 
The major labels distributed large quantities of records, and their operations incurred 
large overheads. In a vertically integrated system where publishing, record labels, 
manufacturing and distribution units were integrated into their own business structure, 
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they achieved economies of scale to reap profits from their own labels (Bakker 2012). 
The system also allowed the major labels to control “the distribution of marginally 
differentiated products” by enabling them to “link available input to reliable and 
established distribution channels” (Hirsch 1972, 646). This meant that multinational 
companies could intensify their control by increasing their exposure among various 
media outlets such as radio, TV and film (Jones 2002, 218).  
Digital Revolution and the Dream of Celestial Jukebox 
The duplication of perfect copies at a cost close to zero enabled by digital technology 
disrupted the conventional music business system, structured around physical artefacts. 
A seismic shift in the music industry was predicted. One of the predictions was that 
ubiquitous access to an unlimited music supply known as the “Celestial Jukebox”, 
where music fans could enjoy an immeasurable scope of music choices, combined with 
peer review and viral impact on the Internet, would help music fans discover lesser-
known or unknown music. This would contribute to achieving the beloved cultural 
attribute whereby a diversity of music choices would flourish (Mann 2000; Pasquale III, 
Weatherall, and Fagin 2002) 
The ubiquity of the music listening experience received significant attention, 
with Goldstein (2003, 22) using the term “Celestial Jukebox”. He described it as:  
 “A technology-packed satellite orbiting thousands of miles above the Earth, 
awaiting a subscriber’s order – like a nickel in the old jukebox, and the punch of a 
button – to connect him to any number of selections from a vast storehouse via a 
home or office receiver that combines the power of a television set, radio, CD 
player, VCR, telephone, fax, and personal computer.”  
The elevation of this practice to a heavenly cultural form was twofold: it was 
“perfecting the law’s early aim of connecting authors to their audiences, free from 
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interference” and it had the potential to monetise every use of the sound, which relates 
to Goldstein (2003)’s assertion that “the best prescription for connecting authors to their 
audiences is to extend rights into every corner” (216). 
This view of the Celestial Jukebox, which was celebrated as a “utopian garden 
of cultural abundance”, however, was highly criticised by Burkart and McCourt (2006), 
who maintained that the digitalisation of music would serve to tighten global recording 
companies’ grip on the digital music distribution platform and thereby reinforce the 
oligopoly through existing market strategies and copyright enforcement. As long as the 
fundamental power structure persisted in the music industry, they argued, the Jukebox 
system would not be “a gateway onto a garden of cultural abundance” but instead would 
“become a tollbooth into a web of privately owned and operated networks where traffic 
in intellectual property is carefully monitored and controlled, a walled garden of closed 
networks with restricted access and tightly circumscribed activities” (Burkart and 
McCourt 2006, 4). 
As digital music streaming services enabled unlimited access to music, Burkart 
(2014) later probed whether they had contributed to a market structure change through 
diversified music consumption. Drawing upon the legal system in the music industry, 
which is structured to preserve the traditional revenue model, he argued that the utopian 
idea of a celestial jukebox is “the false promise of the experience of the digital sublime, 
fashioned as a seamless and elegant digital enclosure” (Burkart 2014, 405). The reality 
of the jukebox, he contended, is manifested in the back-end technical infrastructure 
designed to stimulate the consumption and outmoded legal infrastructure favoured by 
established media companies.  
Recent studies have drawn to the implications of the curation process taking 
place on streaming services. Morris and Powers (2015), for example, examined four 
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music streaming services based on their interfaces, the quality of the curatorial service, 
the identity projected for users, and the level of control users had. They argued that 
streaming services are in fact creating branded musical experiences by creating 
circumscribed tiers of content access, which the authors called a digital enclosure. A 
similar view was expressed by Kjus (2016), who affirmed the service providers’ 
surmountable role embedded in the curation process in the Norwegian market context. 
Consumers who are predisposed to follow the suggestions, he discovered, particularly 
reveal the power that the curated playlist can exert. Service providers, however, are only 
one of the many players involved in the curation process.  Morris (2015) provides a 
valuable insight into the role that intermediaries play in the digital music selection 
process. Whilst tastemakers have long played a role in ‘shaping’ music taste, they relied 
simply on their knowledge. The new breed of intermediaries, entitled as 
‘informediaries’, have an enhanced ability to drive music choice, empowered by 
personalised music suggestions backed up by a massive database (Morris 2015). This 
new body of research on the control that playlists exert over consumers’ choice attests 
to the need for a more detailed exploration. However, the underlying market mechanism 
involved in digital music discovery has seldom been clearly investigated. In order to fill 
this gap, this paper draws insights from Hirsch’s (1969) framework on the organisation 
of the pop music industry (Figure 1) and provides an updated view of digital music 
discovery.  
Digital Music Discovery Networks 
Prior to the arrival of digital technology, music discovery networks were structured to 
overcome the substantial costs and risk incurred by the bets the record companies 
hedged on to produce a few big hits. The recording industry was composed of a network 
of complex organisations in which discovery and filtering was processed at each level 
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of the network (Hirsch 1972). In this system, consumers’ access to cultural products 
was subject to the selections filtered through negotiations of conflicting interests and 
unbalanced power relations.  
The decentralised network enabled by digital technology diversified the avenues 
through which people could discover music. Radiohead’s experiment of “pay-what-you-
want” for their In Rainbows album (Byrne and Yorke 2007) and Nine Inch Nails’ 
voluntary file-sharing of their Ghosts I-IV album are well-known examples of this (Rose 
2007). The arrival of so-called Web 2.0 technologies accelerated the connectivity 
between artists and audiences. The expanded friendship networks enabled by Web 2.0 
social networking sites indicated a reconfiguration of musical tastes and preferences 
(Beer 2008). Famously, YouTube facilitated user participation in contributing to the 
improved exposure of diverse music.1  
In regard to this change, Wikström (2013, 92) remarked, “The connectivity of 
the network is radically improved. The barriers that previously stopped everyone, 
except for a few resource-rich players, from distributing information to members of the 
network have almost completely disappeared.” Significantly, this increased connectivity 
has blurred the distinction between distribution and promotion and the weak link 
between exposure and sales (Wikström 2013). Faced with the potential problem of an 
increased marketing budget with an uncertain sales return, record labels are striving to 
maximise their audience reach.  
When it comes to consumers’ access to musical choices, Spotify, with its close-
to-unlimited access, has changed the playing field entirely. The subscription-and-
                                                 
1 With the exception of a few high profile cases, however, this “free” music business has mostly 
proven to be beneficial only for artists who have already established fanbases (Rutter 2011, 
172). 
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advertising model that affords users unlimited access has achieved remarkable success 
and enabled almost everything to be available online with less friction in terms of 
legality. This legal and unlimited access to music has caused Spotify to be acclaimed as 
“exactly what music fans had been waiting for, fulfilling the long-sought dream of a 
‘Celestial Jukebox’ – a service that makes every song always available, freely and 
legally” (Pollack 2011).  
Long tail and Attention Economy 
One argument closely related to the notion of the Celestial Jukebox is what was once a 
widely popularised notion, the Long Tail economy (Anderson 2006). The lowered cost 
of production and distribution of cultural products was predicted to remove the 
constraints of physical shelf space and distribution and therefore bring about a shift in 
the cultural economy where aggregate demand for marginal taste would constitute an 
attractive economy for competing with hit-driven business. The reality, however, is far 
from this prediction. Denoting the intensified superstar economy in which the top 1% of 
works account for 77% of recorded music income, Mark Mulligan, a music industry 
analyst, proclaimed the end of the long tail (Mulligan 2014). Distinct from the idea that 
music consumers would enjoy the immeasurable scope of musical choices, to the 
majority of consumers, unlimited access to music is just an abundance of choice. 
Defining it as a “Tyranny of Choice”, Mulligan states, “30 million tracks (and counting) 
is a meaningless quantity of music. It would take three lifetimes to listen to every track 
once. There is so much choice that there is effectively no choice at all” (Mulligan 2014). 
Underpinning the mismatch between the prediction and what has actually 
happened is an unexpected challenge that arose in the process of technological 
development (Sørensen 1996; Williams, Stewart, and Slack 2005). The presumption 
that limitless access would lead to cultural diversity was predicated on the idea that peer 
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recommendation, sharing and reviews would enable digital music users to find and 
appreciate lesser or unknown music. Benkler (2006, 426), for example, predicted that 
this social sharing “could entirely supplant the role of the recording industry”, because 
“Jane’s friends and friends of her friends are more likely to know exactly what music 
would make her happy than are recording executives trying to predict which song to 
place, on which station and which shelf, to expose her to exactly the music she is most 
likely to buy in a context where she would buy it.” As an increasing number of 
consumers began to enjoy unprecedented access to music, however, this presumption 
proved to have missed a crucial aspect of music consumption. While people’s music 
taste is complicated and immensely diverse, the majority of people who listen to music 
need guidance on which music they should be listening. In fact, the majority of music 
consumers tend to be “uncritical” and “occasional” purchasers of popular hits, which 
has a significant effect on hit-making and hence major labels’ sustainability (Rogers 
2013, 174). 
Another crucial missing point is the new dynamics that arose in the process of 
technological development. Although the barrier to making an album available on the 
shelf has been removed, a new barrier has surfaced for artists. Rich Bengloff, a former 
President at A2IM, affirms that artists in the digital era struggle to rise above the crowd.  
“Traditionally the only way to monetize was to get into the physical retail and that’s 
how it worked. You had to buy a corporative advertisement into retail. Whether it’s 
promotion or monetisation, we had no access. Things moved forward and the good 
news is now everybody has an access, especially direct access to fans which we never 
had before. The bad news is everybody has access, so how do you get noticed?” (Rich 
Bengloff, Former President at A2IM, Interview) 
 
The point at issue is ascertaining how to grab audiences’ attention. In contrast to 
what is commonly believed, the digital music sphere does have competition for limited 
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space. The limitation imposed by physical space in the conventional setting is replaced 
by the limitation of virtual space – attention. This is what economist Herbert Simon  
predicted at the dawn of the electronic age:2 
“When we speak of an information-rich world, we may expect, analogically, that the 
wealth of information means a dearth of something else – a scarcity of whatever it is 
that information consumes. What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes 
the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of 
attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of 
information sources that might consume it” (Simon 1971, 40–41).  
In the case of the digital music industry, the plenitude is the catalogues and the 
scarcity is people’s attention. In the midst of the geometric increase in music catalogues, 
the way in which people’s attention is allocated is a matter of cultural creativity and 
diversity.  
The Organisation of the Digital Music Industry 
In the fast-changing digital music discovery networks, what we are witnessing is a 
strong convergence of old and new media. This means that the importance of 
conventional gatekeepers as a trusted source of information remains paramount, while 
new promotion channels that have emerged in the digital era are becoming an important 
source for music discovery. Figure 2 illustrates this change. The linear process of music 
discovery from artist to record companies has been modified from Hirsch (1969)’s 
framework on the organisation of the pop music industry. While this structure continues 
to exist, new discovery channels are creating new digital music discovery dynamics. 
Amongst the diverse avenues through which digital music users are discovering music, 
                                                 
2 Benkler (2006) termed this “the Babel objection” to describe the conventional editorial power 
that can continue to exist in order to control the visibility of digital content.  
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this article looks at three major sources: radio, online music blogs, and streaming music 
playlists.3 
(1) Radio 
Radio has traditionally played a central role in songs’ popularity. Amidst the fast 
growth of streaming services, radio remains the number one destination for people’s 
music discovery, followed by friends/ relatives, online music services and social media 
(Nielsen 2017). A radio industry expert thinks that radio is important for two main 
reasons: (1) the ripple effect through which radio influences other media; and (2) the 
wide variety of listeners.  
“Radios are still the number one sort of discovery mechanism for new music and 
have been for some time and I think more than ever. At the moment, stations like 
Radio 1, for example in the UK, are really, really important because it has a ripple 
effect throughout the rest of the industry and that could help with life, it can help 
with TV, it can help with press, it can help with all sorts of other areas of the 
business. So, it’s really important. Also, the reach of radio is huge. Radio listening 
actually went up in the last couple of years. We reached the vast majority of the 
UK population through radio. So, it’s a really, really important part of the overall.” 
(Interview) 
                                                 
3 According to a recent report, smart speakers’ use is on the rise, particularly replacing radio 
listening (Music Ally 2018). 
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Figure 2. Digital Music Discovery Networks 
Radio’s continued significance means that airplay adds great weight to songs’ 
popularity. In conventional recording business settings, radio airplay followed a Top 40 
pre-selection filtering structure. As the increasing adoption of streaming services 
(Nielson 2018, Ofcom 2018) is rapidly bringing about changes in music listening 
behaviours (Datta, Knox, and Bronnenberg 2017), the way which the dynamics between 
radio and streaming services will change remains to be seen.4  
(2) Independent music blogs 
One particular change is an emergence of new media in the publicity sphere that reflects 
the voices of music enthusiasts and consumers. These tools include independent music 
blogs such as Pitchfork, Brooklyn Vegan, Stereogum, Drowned in Sound, and Line of 
                                                 
4 Streaming services’ playlist is increasingly perceived to replace radio’s role. More discussion 
on this is found at below section 3). 
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Best Fit. By leveraging the abundance of content enabled in the digital age, these 
independent music blogs have emerged to provide a rich archive of music 
commentaries. Although most of them were prompted by Napster’s sudden oversupply 
of music, their significance has become heightened in the streaming age.  
Pitchfork is currently the most influential arbiter out of all of the indie rock 
music critic websites. The site began in 1995, when Ryan Schreiber, a 19-year-old high 
school graduate, set up a website to post reviews of indie music and interviews with 
bands he had persuaded to contribute. Its significant role lies in discovering new acts. 
Clap Your Hands Say Yeah, a Brooklyn unsigned band, was an example of a Pitchfork-
picked breakout artist. Pitchfork is one of the chief music reference points for 
independent music lovers, with 2.5 million monthly unique visitors and 400,000 daily 
visits (Lindvall 2010). The role of tastemakers in the digital age remains crucial (Rogers 
2013). Scott Cohen, co-founder of The Orchard, acknowledged that their importance is 
augmented by the increasing growth of the streaming business, especially because of the 
abundance of content.  
“Pitchfork media, it's just a great website/blog that if they give you an amazing 
review – probably the most important medium for indie rock.” (Scott Cohen, co-
founder of The Orchard, Interview) 
As the significance of blogs has increased, their role has also been deeply 
integrated into the entire system of music promotion. Paul Bridgewater, an editor at 
Line of Best Fit, thinks that the role of independent music blogs is equivalent to the test 
bed of new talent, which was the traditional role of A&R. In this way, independent 
music blogs are an essential part of the entire system of promotion. Bridgewater says:  
“Outside we’re known as a natural vehicle for publicising content and bands. We 
have to try and test a formula for three or four bands for the last few years that 
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have gone through really good things. So it was low risk for them. That is how the 
labels see us, potentially not as a quicker voice but almost like a partner, in 
developing bands. And we are brought to the confidence of PR of labels and 
managers at very early stages. Managers would come to us and say, ‘I’ve got a 
band I’ve been developing. I want to know what you guys think, what you think is 
the commercial viability or indie viability or is it someone you would cover?’ It’s 
like a whole kind of network, an organic network that has been developing outside 
of the rim of labels. Where blogs and sites feed into these things and labels kind of 
see what rises at the top.” (Paul Bridgewater, Editor at Line of Best Fit, Interview) 
However, concerns have also been raised regarding the authenticity of finding 
real gems. For example, it is argued that broadened editorial coverage and the 
insurmountable power it can have has obscured its appeal for finding up-and-coming 
aspirants, which is chiefly achieved through defiance of the mainstream (Carter and 
Rogers 2014).  
(3) Streaming playlists 
In the untrammelled garden of digital music choices enabled by streaming services, 
streaming playlists are increasingly becoming an essential route for songs’ discovery 
and popularity. At the outset of the streaming business, however, playlists were not 
something that the service providers had in mind. Rather, they arose in the process 
through which Spotify configured users’ demands through the reiterative processes of 
appropriating users’ changing needs known as “learning-by-doing” (Arrow 1962; 
Rosenberg 1982) and “learning-by-interacting” (Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Sørensen 
1996).  
In the case of Spotify, its music discovery began with a basic keyword search, under the 
assumption that digital music users would know what they wanted. The expanded user 
base and exponential music library prompted Spotify to devise an algorithm-based 
music discovery tool. Based on collaborative filtering, this tool offered personalised 
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recommendations based on the users’ previous listening history and the peers who share 
similar taste (Bendz 2008). No matter how well-contextualised its mechanism might 
have been, however, it soon became evident that algorithm-based music 
recommendation hardly suffices when fathoming people’s complicated taste in music. 
As the streaming market crossed further into mainstream adoption, Spotify realised that 
the majority of its users, in fact, wanted their music choices to be presented to them.5 
Hence came the curated playlist. 
As it transpired that playlists on streaming services can ensure songs’ popularity, 
the criticism was made that streaming playlists were increasingly morphing into 
“playola”: “[S]treaming playlists will become like radio playlists: reachable only by 
labels and artists with the resources to afford robust promotion” (Peoples 2015). Of 
particular relevance to this concern are the underlying dynamics that determine the 
ways in which market control impinges upon music choices. The next section will 
explore this in more detail.  
Resurgence of Market Control 
The new dynamics in the recording industry are exhibiting structural differences that 
diverge considerably from previous settings. A hallmark of these differences is loosened 
control over distribution, which has ultimately led to difficulty in exercising power over 
the music to which music consumers will listen. Contrary to the prediction that the 
                                                 
5 Around the same time in 2014, a competing service Beats Music arose to provide a solution to 
“a problem that most music fans may not realize they have: deciding what to listen to” 
(Sisario 2014). As a response, Spotify developed a music curation and editorial team, as 
well as acquiring The Echo Nest, a music discovery technology company (Spotify 2014). 
More detailed discussion on how Spotify’s music discovery features have evolved, see 
Sun (2019a). 
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dispersed control would enable consumers to discover diverse music and hence 
contribute to cultural diversity, the abundance of choices has intensified the attention 
economy. In the midst of this change, a resurgence of major labels’ market control is 
looming, particularly over streaming playlists, as their prominence is increasing in terms 
of songs’ discovery and popularity. What has occurred as a result is a revival of the pre-
selection process through streaming playlists. The following section discusses four 
major factors that serve to the market control: (1) marketing budgets and investment; (2) 
top-selling catalogues; (3) pre-selection by distributors; and (4) partnerships.  
(1) Marketing budgets and investment 
While the significance of marketing budgets still prevails in the digital era (Wikström 
2013), it is making inroads to the playlist in diverse ways. First, marketing budgets are 
played out as part of licensing deals so major labels can bargain for exclusive 
advertising space (Pelly 2017). In addition, certain advertising spaces can be purchased 
and this financial barrier allows major labels to be better positioned to obtain certain 
spaces and to put forward their tracks to be included on playlists (Cook 2017).   
 
 
Figure 3. Resurgence of market control through digital playola  
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Some of the less obvious, but potentially significant factors include major labels’ 
investment in streaming service providers. For example, before the launch of its service 
in Sweden, Spotify gave major labels equity stakes as part of the licensing deal (Jerräng 
2009) ,6 raising concerns over major labels’ control over Spotify’s business (Teague 
2012; Barr 2013). As Spotify became public in early 2018, major labels are expected to 
benefit for their equity stakes in Spotify (Knopper 2018). This closer relationship 
between the major labels and Spotify could potentially worsen the ‘winner takes it all’ 
situation (Forde 2018). 7 
(2) Top-selling catalogues 
When deciding the range of products to be prioritised in terms of music exposure, the 
power of top-selling catalogues remains unchanged. The increased number of 
catalogues accessible to the public has not eclipsed the significance of the value 
embodied in catalogues of repertoire. This has allowed major labels’ market position to 
persist in the digital era. Scott Cohen shared his views on the way in which catalogues 
serve as an important tool for bargaining. 
“They (major labels) have the shit people want. It gives you power and leverage. I 
don’t think it’s strange. It’s not fair, but it’s life. It’s not fair. You might have a 
better song but Universal gets to have the conversation, because they have Justin 
Bieber and Lady Gaga and all the things that people want. So they can walk in and 
take any medium they want.” 
 
                                                 
6 In the US, major labels received $500 million advances for licensing deals (Byrne 2013).  
7 As of this writing, Spotify announced a new feature to allow artists and labels to pitch their 
tracks to its curation team (Cooke 2018). It remains questionable, how much change this 
can bring to the industrial practice built around the playlist.  
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(Scott Cohen, co-founder of The Orchard, Interview, 7 August 2013) 
Not only do major labels have superiority in terms of increasing publicity for the 
most successful artists, they are also better positioned to gear up new talent. Simon 
Wheeler, Director of Digital at Beggars Group, explained how major labels leverage 
their top-selling catalogues for market control.  
“The major labels have some incredibly big, successful acts that all media want. So 
if someone is saying I want to get to interview One Direction, then someone of that 
company would go and say, ‘Sure, you can get an interview with One Direction but 
you need to feature these bands first.’ It’s sort of like you rub my back and I will 
rub yours.” (Simon Wheeler, Director of Digital at Beggars Group, Interview) 
(3) Pre-selection by distributors 
While the barrier to the pre-filtering of selections has been abolished, streaming service 
providers still feel the need to manage the quality of their content. In the process of 
digital music business valorisation, independent distributors have arisen as a new breed 
of intermediaries between labels/artists and digital music service providers (Galuszka 
2015; Sun 2019b). They began as a simple aggregator, but later, as the digital music 
business grew, evolved as distributors by expanding their roles in the music business. 
One of the roles they took up was providing weekly marketing updates to streaming 
services by filtering a few tracks out of thousands of new releases a week. Combining 
the information they obtain through diverse marketing materials with their relations 
with the labels and artists, distributors flag up a few highlights to streaming music 
service providers.  
(4) Partnerships 
Having stakes in other parts of the industry has been widely used as a way to read 
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market trends and prepare for potential risks or changes. In an era where direct control 
over consumers’ final product has become complicated, this old tactic is resurfacing as 
a tool to manoeuvre consumers’ access. Besides the stakes major labels own in 
streaming services, they also built partnerships on two levels, one for independent 
digital music distributors and one for the streaming playlist companies.  
All three of the major indie labels, INgrooves, The Orchard, and the Alternative 
Distribution Association, have partnered with major labels, and all three of the major 
labels, Universal, Sony, and Warner, distribute their own indie labels’ catalogues 
through their own indie label distribution partners.  
 
Figure 4. Digital Music Discovery Networks by Ownership 
 
What does this mean for market control? In the wake of the changing dynamics 
in which the attention economy has intensified but control over the distribution system 
has significantly weakened, major labels make use of their stakes in independent music 
distributors for maximum exposure of their catalogues. Simon Wheeler affirmed this:  
“For getting that amount of shop window space… If you look at the iTunes front 
page, getting featured on the front page, iTunes isn’t a problem because they treat 
everyone very fairly but some other companies I have had to make deals where 
Universal said I have got 40% market share so I am 40% of your front pages for 
their artists. And Sony would say the same and Warner would say the same, and 
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when you add up their market shares you will probably get to 150%. Because 
everybody exaggerates their market shares so it means that there is no space left for 
other people and they’re surely quite aware of those top mechanics. It could be 
quite tricky, and some people are very pleasantly aware and transparent and very 
honest and some people aren’t.” (Simon Wheeler, Director of Digital at Beggars 
Group, Interview) 
In addition, three major labels, Warner, Sony, and Universal, also own the three 
most streamed playlist companies, Topsify, Filtre, and Digster. It cannot be too far-
fetched to suggest that by way of the ownership of these companies, the playlists 
created by these firms would encourage the musical choices of the repertoire within 
their walled garden.  
Discussion 
This article demonstrates that the vision of the Celestial Jukebox has not materialised, 
but has in fact brought about a resurgence of market control. This is an issue that digital 
music discovery was supposed to counter.  At the centre of this paradox, this paper 
identifies the missing link between the prediction and what has actually happened. 
Contrary to the belief that digital networks would serve to create a greater range of 
choices for consumers and enhanced cultural diversity, the sheer abundance of music 
choices afforded by streaming music services has revealed that what consumers actually 
want is to be directed to what music they should listen to. Underlying the estranged 
development of digital music discovery is the new dynamics emerged in innovation 
processes. The barrier of entry that was lifted has instead been replaced by a new 
barrier: attention. Faced with new challenges of loosened control in the diffused digital 
music discovery networks, the music industry has adopted the old strategy of market 
control, adjusted in a new way: market consolidation and distribution in the form of 
partnerships with the new digital platforms and the power of copyright to maximise 
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exposure of popular repertoire. As a result, a breed of new intermediaries emerged and 
positioned themselves to promote and push certain songs in the guise of a genuine 
music suggestion. The major labels’ strong appetite for manipulating people’s music 
choices has brought back pre-selection process and digital playola which serves the 
resurgence of market control. 
The crux of this is that musical choices and discovery are deeply interlinked 
with cultural creativity and diversity, a culture we envisioned the heavenly musical 
experience would bring about. Despite the much anticipated change, we are actually 
experiencing an encroaching commercial interest, whereby lean back listening is 
encouraged to keep users tuned in for as long as possible. This mirrors Radio’s Top 40 
playlist practice, which led to a popular music culture largely dictated by the lowest 
common denominator (Burnett 1993). Resuming this mode of curating culture might 
bring in more cash in the short term, but could come at the expense of 
cultivating greater diversity in musical culture that all parties have the potential 
to benefit from in the long term. Ultimately, users’ aptitude to enjoy diverse music is 
intimately linked to the cultural asset (Tepper and Hargittai 2009) that will facilitate the 
long-term sustainability of the music industry as a whole. Allowing the market control 
to continue, therefore, carries the risk of the industry’s hard-won digital music listening 
platform becoming a “tollbooth” through which copyright meticulously monetises every 
instance of music listening (Burkart and McCourt 2006), but does not, in turn, foster 
innovation. Future research on the relationship amongst digital music discovery, 
fandom and cultural capital, particularly, the impact on artists’ earnings could further 
illuminate the implications of market control impinging upon digital music choices and 
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